Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 8

Because Fastenal’s free cash flow for 2011 has fallen somewhat short of expectations, we’re playing it safe and using the numbers from the end of 2010 (start of 2010) to make our appraisal. These numbers are:
Free cash flow: $1.307/share
Net liquidity: -$0.04/share
Estimated intrinsic value: $13.03/share

The stock price of $41.42/share is triple our estimated intrinsic value. Thus, this stock will NOT be added to the Doppler Value Investing Model Portfolio, and I will NOT be buying it personally.

The estimated intrinsic value is analogous to book value. Let’s call it Doppler Book Value. Thus, the Doppler price/book is 3.2. The conventional price/book ratio is $4.77. If Fastenal were selling for Doppler book value, it would still be selling for 2.7 times its conventional book value, which is a high ratio. Thus, Doppler Value Investing shows that Fastenal’s intrinsic value is substantially higher than what’s shown by conventional book value.

Because we take into account net liquidity, the stock price has to be adjusted to take this into account. If the net liquidity were positive and equal to the stock price and we could buy the entire company at the current market price, we’d be getting the business for free. On the other hand, if the company had heavy leverage, the adjusted price would be higher than the current market price. Again, if we could buy the entire company, we’d take on all of the liabilities, so the effective price would be higher.

For Fastenal, the net liquidity is a negative 4 cents, which is minuscule. So our effective price is $41.46, 4 cents more than the $41.42 market price. This adjusted price is what we compare to free cash flow. If we didn’t make this adjustment, we’d be penalizing liquid companies and giving brownie points to leveraged ones.

The free cash flow is analogous to earnings. Let’s call it Doppler Earnings. Fastenal’s Doppler Earnings are $1.307/share. The Doppler PE ratio is the adjusted price ($41.46) divided by the Doppler Earnings ($1.307), or 32. If Fastenal were selling for its Doppler Book Value of $13.03, the adjusted price would be $13.07, and the Doppler PE ratio would be 10. While a PE ratio of 10 sounds low, please keep in mind that Doppler Earnings are pre-tax while conventional earnings are after-tax. Income taxes are dependent on earnings, and earnings can be temporarily boosted or suppressed by arbitrary one-time factors.

The Doppler Earnings Yield is the Doppler Earnings ($1.307) divided by the adjusted price ($41.46), which is 3.2% for Fastenal. If Fastenal were selling for its Doppler Book Value of $13.03 (adjusted price of $13.07), its Doppler Earnings Yield would be 10.0%.

The 12-month trailing earnings of Fastenal are $1.13/share, and the conventional PE ratio is 36.7. If Fastenal were trading at its Doppler Book Value of $13.03, the PE ratio would be 11.5.

In order for Fastenal to be a Graham-and-Dodd bargain, it would need a Doppler Earnings Yield of 15% or more (a Doppler PE ratio under 6.7). This would mean a stock price of $8.67 or less, which would present a Doppler price/book ratio of under 67%, a conventional PE ratio of 7.7, and a conventional price/book ratio of 1.8.

The bottom line: Fastenal is an excellent company. It has a wide business moat and a frugal, shareholder-oriented management that isn’t out to brown-nose Wall Street. This is exactly the type of company that Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger would like to buy and that I would like to buy. Unfortunately, the current stock price is too high.

Fastenal is a company worth watching. At a low enough price it’s a steal. I’m hoping that CEO Willard Oberton gets caught lip-syncing on Saturday Night Live so that bargain hunters like myself get a chance to scoop up shares at a good price.

This concludes my analysis of Fastenal.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 7

Before we do anything else, let’s look at Fastenal’s financials in the latest 10Q report (dated Sept. 30, 2011) to make sure that the company hasn’t suddenly fallen off a cliff this year. The total number of shares is 298,636,424 – a slight decrease for the year. Net liquidity is -$104.943 million, or -$0.35/share, which means that Fastenal has taken on more leverage, albeit still a very modest amount. The net change for the first 3 quarters is -$94.084 million.

Cash flow for the first 3 quarters is $297.827 million ($397.103 million annualized). Normalized capital spending for the first 3 quarters is $47.425 million ($63.23 million annualized), or $0.159/share ($0.212/share annualized). The free cash flow for the first 3 quarters is $250.402 million ($333.87 million annualized), or $0.838/share ($1.118/share annualized). Thus, the annualized return on PPE for the first 3 quarters is 52.8%, a slight improvement over 2010 but somewhat short of our projection of 68.6% (the 4-year smoothed average).

What has Fastenal done with the $250.402 million in free cash flow and $94.084 million of additional leverage ($344.486 million total funding raised)?
$163.854 million of the $344.486 million (48%) was paid as income taxes. $150.414 million (44%) was paid out in dividends. Of the $92.479 million of capital spending, an estimated $45.054 million was spent on expansion (13%). The uses of the free cash flow are amply accounted for.

The financial statements in the 10Q show that free cash flow was somewhat less than expected, but nothing appears to be amiss at Fastenal. Given that nothing is amiss, we could (for valuation purposes) retain the assumptions of our Part 6 projections for 2011. But given that the free cash flow for 2011 has fallen short of the projection, let’s make assumptions based on the figures from the end of 2010, because it’s better to err on the side of caution. Our figures from the end of 2010 are:
Free cash flow: $1.307/share
Net liquidity: -$0.04/share

Part 8 will delve into valuation and comparing the valuations from Doppler Value Investing to those from conventional value investing.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 6

Now let’s analyze the financials of Fastenal for prior years.

Number of shares (in millions, split adjusted):
1993: 303.51
1994: 303.51
1995: 303.51
1996: 303.51
1997: 303.51
1998: 303.51
1999: 303.51
2000: 303.51
2001: 303.51
2002: 303.51
2003: 303.508
2004: 303.508
2005: 302.11
2006: 302.413
2007: 302.521
2008: 301.611
2009: 299.981
2010: 300.181

I’m pleased to see that Fastenal isn’t in the habit of diluting shares.

Net liquidity (in millions of dollars):
1993: -2.2
1994: -6.0
1995: -7.6
1996: -24.6
1997: -38.6
1998: -31.2
1999: -8.6
2000: -10.5
2001: 27.5
2002: 7.6
2003: 20.8
2004: -11.4
2005: -36.4
2006: -83.0
2007: -93.6
2008: -74.3
2009: 59.0
2010: -10.9

Net liquidity per share (split adjusted):
1993: -$0.01
1994: -$0.02
1995: -$0.03
1996: -$0.08
1997: -$0.13
1998: -$0.10
1999: -$0.03
2000: -$0.03
2001: $0.09
2002: $0.02
2003: $0.07
2004: -$0.04
2005: -$0.12
2006: -$0.27
2007: -$0.31
2008: -$0.25
2009: $0.20
2010: -$0.04

We see that Fastenal has over time maintained a net liquidity near zero, the middle ground between having cash languish in the treasury vs. taking on the risks associated with illiquidity. Given the solid economics, I see no reason to be concerned.

PPE (in millions of dollars):
1993: 20.577
1994: 28.086
1995: 42.381
1996: 64.611
1997: 85.297
1998: 111.014
1999: 131.413
2000: 158.829
2001: 186.442
2002: 223.952
2003: 266.325
2004: 311.524
2005: 357.326
2006: 423.124
2007: 465.493
2008: 538.805
2009: 571.467
2010: 632.332

PPE per share (split adjusted):
1993: $0.068
1994: $0.093
1995: $0.140
1996: $0.213
1997: $0.281
1998: $0.366
1999: $0.433
2000: $0.523
2001: $0.614
2002: $0.738
2003: $0.877
2004: $1.026
2005: $1.183
2006: $1.399
2007: $1.539
2008: $1.786
2009: $1.905
2010: $2.106

We can see that Fastenal is expanding. The fact that Fastenal doesn’t have to go deeply in hock to do so is a positive sign. Growth stock fans should be interested.

Cash flow (in millions of $):
1994: 17.577
1995: 32.994
1996: 32.648
1997: 36.402
1998: 71.685
1999: 89.882
2000: 81.547
2001: 131.371
2002: 49.146
2003: 114.301
2004: 118.032
2005: 212.875
2006: 210.265
2007: 332.836
2008: 428.858
2009: 449.523
2010: 345.004

Free cash flow (in millions of $):
1994: 15.519
1995: 30.185
1996: 28.41
1997: 29.941
1998: 63.155
1999: 78.781
2000: 68.406
2001: 115.488
2002: 30.502
2003: 91.906
2004: 91.4
2005: 181.723
2006: 174.532
2007: 290.524
2008: 382.309
2009: 395.643
2010: 287.857

Return on PPE (unsmoothed):
1994: 75.4%
1995: 107.5%
1996: 67.0%
1997: 46.3%
1998: 74.0%
1999: 71.0%
2000: 52.1%
2001: 72.7%
2002: 16.4%
2003: 41.0%
2004: 34.3%
2005: 58.3%
2006: 48.8%
2007: 68.7%
2008: 82.1%
2009: 73.4%
2010: 50.4%

Note that Fastenal’s return on PPE is very good. Even in the worst years, it has a positive free cash flow. You could also argue that the investments in inventory and receivables that penalize earnings (and were unusually large in 2002) are necessary for the company’s growth. That said, the fluctuations in performance show that you cannot count on any company to be 100% immune to the occasional downturn.

The smoothed return on PPE is the 4-year average return on PPE. The smoothed return on PPE for 2010 is the average return on PPE for the years 2007 through 2010. The returns on PPE for these years were 68.7%, 82.1%, 73.4%, and 50.4%, or an average of 68.6%. Multiplying 68.6% by the PPE of $1.905/share at the end of 2009 (beginning of 2010) gives us 2010′s smoothed free cash flow of $1.307/share.

The smoothed returns on PPE for each year are:
1998: 73.7%
1999: 64.6%
2000: 60.9%
2001: 67.4%
2002: 53.0%
2003: 45.5%
2004: 41.1%
2005: 37.5%
2006: 45.6%
2007: 52.5%
2008: 64.5%
2009: 68.3%
2010: 68.6%

We see that Fastenal’s smoothed annual return on PPE is usually between 40% and 70%.

The resulting smoothed free cash flow per share at the end of each year is:
1998: $0.207
1999: $0.236
2000: $0.263
2001: $0.353
2002: $0.326
2003: $0.336
2004: $0.361
2005: $0.387
2006: $0.539
2007: $0.735
2008: $0.995
2009: $1.226
2010: $1.307

To obtain the estimated intrinsic business value, multiply the free cash flow by 10 and then add the net liquidity. In 2010, Fastenal generated $1.307/share of free cash flow and ended the year with -$0.04/share in net liquidity. The resulting estimated intrinsic business value for the end of 2010 (beginning of 2011) is $13.03/share.

The estimated intrinsic business value per share (split adjusted) at the end of each year is:
1998: $1.97
1999: $2.33
2000: $2.60
2001: $3.62
2002: $3.28
2003: $3.43
2004: $3.57
2005: $3.75
2006: $5.12
2007: $7.04
2008: $9.71
2009: $12.46
2010: $13.03

We can see here that Fastenal’s estimated intrinsic business value shows a clear upward trend with only one down year. The intrinsic business value of any good stock should rise over time. A successful company could reinvest its free cash flow into expanding the business and thus increase its free cash flow further, or the company could let the cash accumulate on its balance sheet while maintaining its free cash flow.

Given that we’re close to the end of 2011, you could argue that Fastenal’s current intrinsic business value is higher than the $13.03/share of late 2010/early 2011. Multiplying the 68.6% smoothed return on PPE by the $2.106/share of PPE at the end of 2010 gives us a projected smoothed free cash flow of $1.44/share for 2011. The year is about 96% over, so that means Fastenal has generated a projected $1.39/share of free cash flow. Remember that our free cash flow figure is PRE-TAX, so we must deduct 38% to account for this, which leaves us $0.86/share of projected AFTER-TAX free cash flow. (In 2010, Fastenal earned $430.640 million and paid $163.609 million in current income taxes.) We end up with an estimated intrinsic business value of $13.89/share.

Despite the superior economics, management, and financial performance of Fastenal, the current price ($41.42/share) is substantially more expensive than we’d like to pay.

Part 7 will examine the latest 10Q form to verify that Fastenal’s fundamentals haven’t suddenly fallen off a cliff in 2011.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 5

Instead of equity, total assets, or “invested capital”, I use PPE as a yardstick for the company’s capital base. The amount of free cash flow earned per unit of PPE is my measure of the company’s return on investment. I use “Return on PPE” as a substitute for return on equity, return on assets, and “return on invested capital”. A high-quality company will generate lots of free cash flow per unit of PPE while a low-quality company will generate little or no free cash flow (or even negative free cash flow) per unit of PPE. The formula is:
RET_PPE(Y)=FCF(Y)/PPE(Y-1)
where RET_PPE (Y) is this year’s return on PPE, FCF (Y) is this year’s free cash flow, and PPE (Y-1) is the plant/property/equipment at cost at the end of last year (the beginning of this year).

Fastenal started 2010 (ended 2009) with $571.467 million in PPE and generated $287.857 million in free cash flow. The return on PPE is 50.4%, which is excellent. (Think of the return on PPE as the Doppler Return on Equity.) This shows that Fastenal is a high-quality company that can generate a substantial amount of free cash flow per unit of PPE.

The next step is to count up the number of shares. At the end of 2010, there were 147,430,712 shares outstanding and 2,660,000 options outstanding for a total of 150,090,712 shares. I include options, because a rising stock price would lead to exercised options and thus dilute the per-share intrinsic value by increasing the number of shares outstanding. It’s good to see that the potential for dilution is modest.

That said, Fastenal had a 2-for-1 stock split in 2011, which means that there were twice as many shares at the end of 2010 as originally stated in the report. So this brings the number of shares to 300,181,424. There were also 2-for-1 splits in 2005 and 2002, so the number of shares originally reported from 2002-2004 must be multiplied by 4, and the number of shares originally reported from 2001 and earlier must be multiplied by 8.

At the start of 2011 (end of 2010), the PPE was $632.332 million. Assuming a return on PPE of 50.4%, projected free cash flow for 2011 is $318.695 million, or $1.062/share. The net liquidity of -$10.859 million is -$0.04/share.

To get the intrinsic business value, mutliply the free cash flow by 10 and then add the net liquidity. The formula is:
EST_VAL(Y)=10*FCF_SM_SH(Y)+NETLIQ_SH(Y)

The instrinsic value of Fastenal at the end of 2010 was 10*$1.062 – -$.04, or $10.58/share. Given that Fastenal currently sells for over $40/share, this stock isn’t a screaming buy at the moment.

That said, we’re not finished yet. The intrinsic business value calculation is based on only one year’s worth of return on PPE data. Part 6 will consist of repeating this analysis with financial data from previous years and using averaged return on PPE figures to smooth out fluctuations. Yes, even a company as ultra-conservative as Fastenal can have fluctuations in performance. Yes, the companies that show smooth earnings growth year after year have ways of manipulating their numbers to brown-nose Wall Street.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 4

Here in Part 4, I will calculate the free cash flow of Fastenal for 2010. My method of calculating cash flow is based on that described in the book Cash Flow and Security Analysis by Kenneth Hackel and Joshua Livnat. However, please note that the Doppler method OMITS changes in current liabilities.

Why do I omit changes in current liabilities when calculating cash flow even though the conventional definition includes them? First, it makes companies look bad when they pay suppliers and look good when they don’t. Not paying suppliers is an unsustainable way to increase cash flow.

Second, the differences in the treatment of short-term and long-term liabilities is arbitrary. The classic definition of free cash flow would penalize a company that pays off a company that sells a bond (borrowing money from bondholders) and uses the proceeds to pay back suppliers. The reason for this is that money owed to suppliers is classified as short-term liabilities and part of operations while money owed to bondholders is classified as long-term liabilities and part of financing. Under the Doppler method, money owed to suppliers is considered to be part of financing. A company that sells a bond and uses the proceeds to pay back suppliers has merely replaced one liability with another and is no better and no worse off after the transaction than before. (In practice, the company may even be better off, because it doesn’t have to pay off this liability as soon and thus has more breathing room.)

For 2010, the cash flow components of Fastenal are:
Net sales (+): $2,269.471 million
Cost of sales (-): $1,094.635 million
Operating/admin expenses (-): $745.112 million
Depreciation (+): 40.688 million
Change in bad debt expense (+): 8.658 million
Stock-based compensation (+): 4.030 million
Amortization of non-compete (+): .067 million
Change in trade accounts receivable (+): -64.622 million
Change in inventories (+): -48.964 million
Change in other current assets (+): -24.577 million

Fastenal’s cash flow for 2010 is $345.004 million. Note that depreciation, bad debt expense, stock-based compensation, and amortization do not constitute an explicit expenditure of cash but are included in the entries that penalize our calculation of cash flow (namely cost of sales or operating/admin expenses).

Cash flow is penalized by increases in receivables, inventories, and other current assets. An increase in receivables increases the sales but does NOT add cash, because the money hasn’t been collected yet. (Companies have gone under as a result of extending too much credit and not being able to collect on it.) An increase in inventories or other current assets means that cash has been spent but not yet counted as an expense. The expense of increasing inventories isn’t recorded until the inventory is sold or gets written off. Prepaid expenses aren’t counted as expenses until the service is actually used. (Companies have gone under as a result of purchasing too much inventory and being unable to sell it.)

Not all of a company’s cash flow can actually be saved. Every year, some of the plant, property, and equipment must be replaced because it has worn out or become obsolete. The cash flow remaining after necessary capital expenditures is free cash flow, because it’s free for the company to use for expanding operations, for paying dividends, or for the treasury.

I could subtract all capital expenditures from cash flow, but that would unfairly penalize companies that are expanding and unfairly reward companies that are shrinking. Another method is to use the formula:
NCAP(Y) = PPE(Y-1) + CAP_EXP(Y) – CAP_DIV(Y) – PPE(Y)
where NCAP (Y) = this year’s normalized capital spending, PPE (Y-1) = last year’s plant/property/equipment at cost, CAP_EXP(Y) = this year’s capital expenditures, CAP_DIV(Y) = this year’s capital divestitures, and PPE (Y) = last year’s plant/property/equipment at cost. The problem with this method is that any acquisitions or divestitures that take place will throw off these calculations. However, from the analysis I have done, most companies need to spend between 5% and 10% of their PPE to maintain it. Please note that the PPE figures are the original cost figures, NOT the depreciated value (which is subject to arbitrary accounting methods).

To be conservative, I assume that a company needs to spend 10% of its PPE to maintain it. Note that the PPE value for the year Y-1 is also the PPE value for the start of the year Y. Thus, the formula for normalized capital spending is:
NCAP(Y) = .1 * PPE(Y-1)

At the end of 2009 (beginning of 2010), Fastenal’s PPE at cost was $571.467 million. This means that normalized capital spending for 2010 was $57.147 million. Subtracting it from the cash flow of $345.004 million gives us a free cash flow of $287.857 million. The net liquidity of -$10.859 million is probably not a problem given that this is less than 4% of the year’s free cash flow.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 3

We’ll start to dig into the financial data. Fortunately, Fastenal’s financial statements are straightforward. Except for Berkshire Hathaway, I INSIST on scrutinizing the financials before investing in a stock. While my attitude may keep me out of interesting opportunities, I believe it will also keep me out of the next Enron, whose financial statements were known for being extremely complicated. (I think the management intentionally made them complicated.)

The focus here in Part 3 will be on the net liquidity. Net liquid assets is the liquid assets minus all liabilities. If the company has positive net liquid assets, then it can pay off all liabilities without having to sell nonliquid assets. To be conservative, I EXCLUDE inventories and receivables. All too often, inventory doesn’t sell, and receivables don’t get paid.

Liquid assets consist of cash and marketable securities (at fair value). At the end of 2010, Fastenal had $143.693 million in cash, $26.067 million in short-term marketable securities, and $5.152 million in long-term marketable securities. Thus, Fastenal had a total of $174.912 million in liquid assets.

At the end of 2010, Fastenal had $60.474 million in accounts payable, $96.412 million in accrued expenses, $5.299 million in income taxes payable, and $23.586 in deferred income tax liabilities. Thus, Fastenal had a total of $185.771 million in total liabilities.

So at the end of 2010, Fastenal had -$10.859 million in net liquid assets. I’d prefer to see positive net liquid assets, but I’m not ready to rule out Fastenal as an investment just yet. Part 4 will discuss free cash flow.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 2

As I explained in Part 1, Fastenal is an excellent company economically. How good is the management? I don’t have the opportunity to meet with Fastenal’s executives, so I’ll read between the lines. And I see several positives.

Fastenal’s annual report includes the 10-K form, which Fastenal and other publicly traded companies MUST file with the SEC. The 10-K form must include a description of the company’s risks and additional details that may put the company’s financials in a negative light. Companies are not required to include the 10-K form with the annual report, and most do not. The fact that Fastenal does include the 10-K form indicates that management has nothing to hide. Fastenal also saves money this way, because the 10-K form is printed on cheaper paper. While there are slick color photographs and graphics in the annual report, most of it is occupied by the 10-K form. I believe Fastenal’s management is frugal and isn’t concerned about brown-nosing Wall Street.

Insider ownership also paints a positive picture of Fastenal. CEO William Oberton has 464,880 shares, currently worth over $18 million, and much greater than his salary and even his bonus. He has a lower salary than most of his peers, so he clearly has a large stake in the long-term health of Fastenal. Some of the other insiders at Fastenal own even more stock than Oberton does. For example, Chairman of the Board and former CEO Robert Kierlin owns 13,750,000 shares, worth over half a billion dollars. Clearly, the interests of the people running Fastenal are aligned with those of shareholders.

Thus, reading between the lines shows positive intangibles. Given good economics and good management, Fastenal is clearly worth further investigation.

Doppler Analysis of Fastenal: Part 1

Fastenal (FAST) is a wholesaler and retailer of fasteners and other industrial and construction supplies. It is cited by Pat Dorsey in his book The Little Book that Builds Wealth as an example of a company that benefits from a moat protecting it from competition. Because its products are very expensive to ship relative to their prices, Fastenal benefits from having more locations than any competitor and thus being closer to more customers than any competitor. It also helps that when customers need a fastener, they need it immediately and can’t afford to wait for it to be shipped from far away. Fastenal can meet the needs of customers because it has its own in-house truck fleet and thus bypasses the need for UPS and other expensive shipping services. Furthermore, most geographical areas are too small to support a second player in Fastenal’s market. Thus, Fastenal is effectively impossible to dislodge. No conceivable technology can possibly render Fastenal’s product obsolete. Therefore, Fastenal is a high-quality company that is clearly worth further investigation.

Model Portfolio Update: November 2011

For the month, the initial contents of the Doppler Value Model Portfolio were:
$62,382.49 USD in the Doppler Value Treasury Money Market Fund
$80,862.56 HKD in the Everbank Hong Kong Dollar CD ($10,414.93 USD)
100 shares of BRKB ($7,786.00 USD)
222 shares of DFJ ($9,190.80 USD)
103 shares of FXY ($12,980.06 USD)
Total market value: $102,754.28 USD

The final contents of the Doppler Value Model Portfolio were:
$62,371.46 USD in the Doppler Value Treasury Money Market Fund
$80,871.20 HKD in the Everbank Hong Kong Dollar CD ($10,404.12 USD)
100 shares of BRKB ($7,876.00 USD)
222 shares of DFJ ($9,397.26 USD)
103 shares of FXY ($13,078.94 USD)
Total market value:$103,127.78  USD
Gain: 0.4%

Details:
Cash: -0.215% yield, -$11.02 USD in interest earned, $0.00 USD in dividends earned
Hong Kong Dollar CD principal: $80,840.39 HKD to $80,866.59 HKD (rolled over on the 14th)
Hong Kong Dollar CD yield:  0.13%
Hong Kong Dollar CD accrued interest: $22.17 HKD to $4.61 HKD

Model Portfolio Update: October 2011

For the month, the initial contents of the Doppler Value Model Portfolio were:
$62,394.04 USD in the Doppler Value Treasury Money Market Fund
$80,853.63 HKD in the Everbank Hong Kong Dollar CD ($10,387.16 USD)
100 shares of BRKB ($7,104.00 USD)
222 shares of DFJ ($9,676.98 USD)
103 shares of FXY ($13,163.40 USD)
Total market value: $102,725.58 USD

The final contents of the Doppler Value Model Portfolio were:
$62,382.49 USD in the Doppler Value Treasury Money Market Fund
$80,862.56 HKD in the Everbank Hong Kong Dollar CD ($10,414.93 USD)
100 shares of BRKB ($7,786.00 USD)
222 shares of DFJ ($9,190.80 USD)
103 shares of FXY ($12,980.06 USD)
Total market value: $102,754.28 USD
Gain: 0.0%

Details:
Cash: -0.218% yield, -$11.55 USD in interest earned, $0.00 USD in dividends earned
Hong Kong Dollar CD principal: $80,840.39 HKD to $80,840.39 HKD
Hong Kong Dollar CD yield:  0.13%
Hong Kong Dollar CD accrued interest: $13.24 HKD to $22.17 HKD